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The clearing of tree-covered land near the equator arouses
widespread debate and concern.  Linkages between vegetation and
global climate remain the subject of controversy (Detwiler and
Hall 1988).  By contrast, there is little doubt that
deforestation impacts "ethno-biological information."  Although
tropical forests cover less than 10% of the Earth's land surface,
they contain half the world's plant and animal species (Myers
1984; Wilson 1988).  In addition to species extinction, land
clearing eliminates forest dwellers' environmental knowledge.
Rarely have economists addressed the management of ethno-
biological information directly, concentrating instead on the
study of policies that accelerate deforestation.  For example,
Repetto and Gillis (1988) find that, in many countries, royalties
paid for access to public forests are far below the commercialvalue or stumpage value of the timber.  This creates strong
incentives to log these areas rapidly, and then move quickly to
new sites.  In addition, Mahar (1988) contends that tax breaks
and other subsidies have stimulated cattle ranching in some parts
of the Brazilian Amazon.
Although economists have not addressed the management of ethno-
biological information directly, both "in situ" and collected
ethno-biological information have value to humans.  The genotypes
of naturally- occurring plants have often been used to increase
the yield of agricultural crops.  Many medicines are based on
wild plants.  However, before wild genotypes are useful, they
must be identified, collected, and analyzed to determine useful
properties.  In addition to this analysis, we need to scrutinize
the trade-offs associated with using tropical forests as a
natural storehouse of ethno-biological information.  Also no one
has determined  the likely impacts of various policies on
information stocks.
These issues are the focus of this paper.  By using a control
model, we identify the costs and benefits of tree clearing near
the equator.  We also discuss the necessary conditions for
socially efficient deforestation and information collection.
These conditions serve as a framework for assessing how market
forces, technology, and public policy influence private decisions
about the management of tropical forests.  In particular, we
discuss the results of establishing "ecosystem reserves," easing
developing countries' debt burdens, altering tenure arrangements,
and improving technology to collect and use that information.
THE MODEL
Mining models characterize an efficient schedule for depleting an
exhaustible resource (Hotelling 1931; Dasgupta and Heal 1979;
Devarajan and Fisher 1981).  We can use such a model to analyze
loss of tropical forests.  Once cleared, those forests recover
their original ethno-biological diversity slowly or never (Gomez-
Pompa "et al." 1972).  Accordingly, deforestation is
irreversible.
To describe socially efficient use and management of tropical
forests, we must change the basic mining model and consider
agricultural rents captured by the owners of deforested land
(Brazee and Mendelsohn 1990).  We must also address income from
forestry activities that do not require deforestation and the
"in-situ" values of tree-covered land (Vousden 1973).
People usually clear forests to plant crops and to raise
livestock.  It is equally true of agricultural colonists in the
developing world today.  Ehui and Hertel (1989) say that the
opening of "virgin" lands for crop and livestock production can
provide a considerable stimulus for an agricultural economy.
Conversely, the value of recently cleared land can be low because
of poor soils and isolation from markets.  In general, though, we
can treat agricultural rents captured at time t, A(t), as anincreasing function of cleared land. That is, agricultural rents
increase but at a decreasing rate as cleared land increases.
Cleared land equals land originally covered with primary forests
F0, less current tree-covered area, F(t):
(1) A(t) = A(F0-F(t)).
Tropical forests yield myriad "in situ" values.  The value of
primary concern in this analysis (and in much of the scientific
literature) is ethno-biological information.  Distinct from other
benefits of standing forests, anthropologists, botanists, and
others whose time is scarce, must collect that information before
using it.  In addition, "archived" species and folk knowledge
make up a stock, rather than a flow that collects over time.
Existing economic literature does not address these
characteristics.  In our model, E(t) expresses the value of
archived ethno-biological information at time t as an increasing
and concave function of the stock of archived information, I(t):
(2) E(t) = E(I(t)).
The opportunity cost, C(t), of information collection at date t
is an increasing and convex function of inputs to the activity,
N(t):
(3) C(t) = C(N(t)).
If input costs rise with use, then C(t) is an increasing and
convex function of input use.  That is, the cost of a unit of
effort devoted to information collection increases, at an
increasing rate, as that effort increases.  This model assumes
that maintaining the stock of archived information ("i.e.",
managing "ex situ" species and folk knowledge) is costless.
We can model other "in situ" values of standing forests in a
simpler fashion.  The flow of watershed management and climatic
benefits at time t is generally an increasing and concave
function of F(t).  So is the income earned from sustainable
commercial forestry, which is distinct from timber income during
the early stages of land clearing (Sedjo 1987).  Aggregating "in
situ" benefits unrelated to biological diversity and the returns
to "environmentally benign logging" in a single function, B(t),
one obtains:
(4) B(t) = B(F(t)).
Finally, stumpage values are an important component of the income
earned by agents of deforestation, agriculturalists and loggers
alike.  We can express values captured at time t, R(t), as an
increasing and concave function of the land clearing rate, D(t):
(5) R(t) = R(D(t)).
Combining agricultural rents, "in situ" values, income from
sustainable commercial forestry, and stumpage values collected by
agents of deforestation, functions (1) through (5), yields an
objective function  -- the net discounted social value of the
area originally covered with trees:(6) Int[0, infinity] exp[-rt]{R(D(t)) + A(F0-F(t)) + B(F(t)) +
E(I(t)) - C(N(t))}dt,
where r is the real discount rate.
With the control variables D(t) and N(t), the objective function
contains two state variables.  We can describe by transition
equations tree-covered area, F(t), and archived ethno-biological
information, I(t):
(7) dF(t)/dt = - D(t) and
(8) dI(t)/dt = G[F(t),N(t)],
  with both first partial derivatives of G[F(t),N/t)] positive,
where G[F(t),N(t)] relates information collection at time t to
forested area and collection effort at time t.  We assume that
this collection (production) function is increasing in both
arguments and concave.  In transition equation (8), F(t) serves
as a proxy for the stock of unarchived ethno-biological
information that exists in tropical forests.
RESULTS
To determine socially efficient use and management of tropical
forests, net present value function (6) maximizes the two control
variables, D(t) and N(t), subject to transition equations (7) and
(8), the initial levels of the state variables, F0 and I0, and
non-negativity constraints on the control and state variables.
Application of the maximum principle (Kamien and Schwartz 1981;
Pontryagin "et al." 1962) provides the necessary conditions for
the optimal paths of D(t) and N(t).  Assume functions R(), A(),
B(), and E() are concave and C( ) is convex, then the objective
function (6) is concave in the control and state variables.  This
is sufficient to satisfy both the second-order and transversality
conditions.
In addition to transition equations (7) and (8) and the non-
negativity constraints, the necessary conditions for an internal
maximum are:
 (9) exp[-rt]dR(D(t))/dD(t) - L1(t) = 0,
(10) exp[-rt]dC(N(t))/dN(t) - L2(t) partial G[F(t),N(t)]/partial
N = 0,
(11) exp[-rt]{dB(F(t))/dF(t) - dA(F0-F(t))/dF(t)} + L2(t) partial
G[F(t),N(t)]/partial F + dL1(t)/dt = 0 , and
(12) exp[-rt]dE(I(t))/dI(t) + dL2(t)/dt = 0 ,
where L1(t) and L2(t) are the adjoint variables for F(t) and
I(t), respectively.  Equations (9) and (10) are the necessary
conditions for a maximum with respect to each of the two control
variables, D(t) and N(t).  Conditions (11) and (12) are adjoint
equations.Equation (9) is a standard mining model result.  In mining
models, the net present value of benefits minus costs from
extraction at every time t must equal the value of another unit
of stock at time t.  In the context of our model at every time t,
the discounted value of net revenues from logging a hectare
should equal the value of another hectare of standing forest.
The value of a hectare of standing forest includes "in situ" uses
and returns from sustainable forestry minus the agricultural
value lost from not clearing.
Equation (10) requires that the discounted marginal cost of
information collection effort at time t equals the marginal value
product of that effort at time t.  The marginal cost of
information collection effort is the additional cost from
devoting more effort to information collection.  The marginal
value product of effort equals the marginal value of information
multiplied by the marginal product of collection effort.  The
marginal value of information is the value from an additional
unit of information collected.  The marginal product is the
quantity of information collected from an additional unit of
effort.
Equation (11) describes how the value of an additional unit of
forest changes over time.  In a standard mining model, the value
of a unit of stock is constant over time.  Here the value of an
additional unit changes over time as the benefits of the standing
forest unrelated to ethno-biological information, the value of
agricultural land, and the value of ethno-biological information
change overtime.
For equation (12) to hold, the discounted value of
ethnobiological information collected should equal the change
over time in the value of collected information.  If we add to
the stock of collected ethno-biological information through
additional collection, then the value of this addition should
equal the change in value to the total stock.
To analyze the qualitative impacts of public policy, market
forces, and technology, we eliminate time derivatives from the
necessary conditions and derive comparative statics for the
resulting system.  For this analysis to yield clear insights, we
need to simplify the model.  Specifically, simplify three
components of the objective function (6):
(3') E(t) = V(t) x I(t),
(4') C(t) = W x N(t), and
(5') R(t) = P(t) x D(t),
where V(t) is the marginal value of information at date t, W is
an externally determined wage, and P(t) is the marginal stumpage
value of commercial timber extracted from a unit of deforested
land at date t.
These assumptions describe the decision-making environment facing
a region or country with few ethno-biologically diverse forests
and change three of the necessary conditions.  We then drop the
adjoint variables, all time derivatives from (7), (8) and (11),
and the three changed necessary conditions (9'), (10') and (12').The result is four equations with the two control and two state
variables implicit functions of the parameters.  See the Appendix
for details of the procedure.
The previous results describe behavior during the deforestation
era but do not determine the duration of the deforestation era.
To complete the model, a condition that determines the duration
of the deforestation era is needed.  For simplicity, we will
assume that all forests not placed in "ecosystem reserves" will
eventually be developed:
(13)  Fmin - F0 + Int[0,T] D(s) ds  = 0,
where Fmin is the stock of tropical forests on which timber
harvesting is prohibited ("e.g." land placed in parks), and T is
the length of the deforestation period.  Fmin is a parameter,
while T is an endogenous variable.  The assumption that all
forests outside of ecosystem reserves will be cleared is a
simplifying technical assumption.  Conditions under which this
assumption is valid are presented in Levhari and Liviatan (1977).
The five equations closely approximate a simultaneous system of
equations.  Comparative statics analysis allows us to determine
the impact of shifting an exogenous parameter on endogenous
variables.  We can derive the comparative statics of that system
by applying standard methodology (Samuelson 1948; Silberberg
1978).  Table 1 summarizes the results of this analysis of
comparative statics.  Plus and minus signs in that table refer to
direct and inverse relationships, respectively, between exogenous
parameters and endogenous variables.  A zero shows the absence of
a relationship.
THE RETURNS TO DEFORESTATION
Throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America, agents of
deforestation collect two kinds of income.  One is stumpage
values, represented by P(t) in the model.  The other is
agricultural rents, represented by A(F0-F(t)).  As noted in the
introduction, public policy influences both returns.  Repetto and
Gillis (1988) argue that  excessive logging is a classic example
of rent capture brought on by under-pricing of access to
publicly-owned resources. In addition, some governments have
subsidized agricultural land clearing (Mahar 1988).
Reducing either P(t) or A(F0-F(t)) helps to arrest deforestation,
D(t).  In 1989, for example, the Brazilian government stopped
offering tax breaks to cattle ranchers in the Amazon Basin.
Pearce (1991) contends that this policy change helps to explain
recent declines in agricultural land clearing.
As shown in the first and sixth rows of Table 1, lessening the
income of agents of deforestation also has a positive impact on
the gathering of ethno-biological information.  This linkage
arises because the cross-partial derivative of the information
collection function is positive.  Reduced deforestation, which bydefinition increases F(t), causes collection effort, N(t), as
well as stock of archived species and folk knowledge, I(t), to
increase.
It is important to distinguish stumpage values collected when
land is cleared, P(t), from benefits associated with sustainable
commercial forestry.  Our model includes the latter in B(t).
Note that an increase in B(t) will slow deforestation, and
increase the collection of ethno-biological information.  A
permanent rise in stumpage price will increase both the revenues
received when land is cleared and revenues received from
sustainable commercial forestry.  These are opposing impacts.  An
increase in the revenues from clearing provided incentives for
faster deforestation and less gathering of ethno-biological
information.  An increase in the revenues from future sustainable
forestry provides incentives for slower deforestation and more
gathering of ethno-biological information.  Which impact
dominates is an empirical question.
Table 1.  Comparative Statics Results
(Pr means partial below)
                                           Variables [note 1]
Parameters         Description          D(s)  F(t)  I(s)  N(t)  T
A(F0-F(t))         agricultural rents    +     -     -     -   -
B(F(t))            forest values         -    +     +     +    +
                   unrelated to
                   ethno-biological
                   information
Fmin               forest land on        0    0     0     0     -
                   which timber
                   harvesting is
                   prohibited
Pr G F(F(t),N(t))  marginal product      -   +     +     +     +
----------------   of standing forest
Pr F               in information
                   collection
Pr G N(F(t),N(t)   marginal product      +   -     -     -     -
---------------    of collection effort
Pr N               in information
                   collection
(t)               current stumpage      +   -     -     -     -
                   price
dP(t)/dt           temporal change       -   +     +     +     +
                   in stumpage
                   prices
r                  real interest rate    +   -     -     -     -
V(t)               marginal value of     -   +     +     +     +
                   archived information
W                  marginal cost of      -   +     +     +     +                   effort devoted to
                   information collection
1. Assume Pr [Pr G]/Pr F Pr N to be positive throughout this
analysis.
FOREST MANAGEMENT, DEBT RELIEF, AND ECOSYSTEM RESERVES
International efforts to save tropical forests now have a dual
focus.  First they help establish ecosystem reserves by
prohibiting logging and agricultural colonization.  Also they
help ease developing countries' debt burdens. The thinking is
that as real interest rates drop, the present value of  future
benefits from forest conservation increases.
We can use comparative statics results to assess both
initiatives, often tied together in "debt-for-nature swaps."  In
this paper's model, Fmin. represents the total area placed in
ecosystem reserves.  As reported in the third row of Table 1,
increasing Fmin brings forward the date, T, when the "post-
deforestation era" begins.  Significantly, however, this affects
neither deforestation nor collection of ethno-biological
information before T.  This is not to deny, of course, that we
may recover more species and folk knowledge after T because of a
larger standing forest.
An important caveat for this result arises from the model's
aggregative structure.  We could place easily accessible forests
in a reserve.  This might cause timber harvesting and
agricultural colonization to lessen for awhile because loggers,
farmers, and ranchers would have to relocate to more remote
areas.  Also, the delayed deforestation would allow information
collection to increase.
The results of dealing with tropical deforestation by easing
developing countries' debt burdens are separate from the total
impacts of establishing ecosystem reserves.  Although several
factors determine the real interest rate, debt relief by
decreasing the demand for financial capital could reduce the
real interest rate.  Reducing the real interest rate slows
deforestation while leading to an increase in collection effort,
the size of the standing forest, and the stock of archived
ethno-biological information (see eighth row of Table 1).
Figures 1A and 1B depict the differences between the impacts of
debt relief and the results of creating ecosystem reserves.
Comparative statics analysis of interest rate changes is also
subject to a caveat.  In addition to reflecting society's time
preferences, real interest rates guide the allocation of scarce
financial capital.  As those rates fall, capital becomes more
available, which causes the economy to grow.  This can, in turn,
stimulate demand for timber, agricultural commodities, and other
products extracted from tree-covered land.TREES, TENURE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Property arrangements, rights in ethno-biological information
and its substitutes, and technology used to exploit those
commodities, also influence development of tropical forests.
Land Tenure
Agricultural use rights are the obvious feature of most frontier
tenure regimes in the developing world.  Raising crops or
livestock where trees used to grow is necessary for new land
claims along agriculture's extensive margin.  Similarly,
continuous agricultural land use is essential to keep others from
violating one's formal or informal property rights (Southgate
1990).
This type of tenure regime makes the capital gains associated
with delayed deforestation insecure.  One capital gain arises
from an increase over time in stumpage prices, dP(t)/dt.  The
seventh row of Table 1 shows that strengthening the property
rights of forest dwellers to enhance their ability to capture
this capital gain actually increases forested area and the stock
of archived ethno-biological information in all time periods.
Weakened property rights discourage loggers from managing tree-
covered land for the capital gains generated by rising stumpage
values.  In the same way, tenurial conditions keep agricultural
colonists from following guidelines like those described by Ehui
and Hertel (1989).  Fearing that anyone willing to clear
"unimproved" land can claim it, colonists will always deforest
immediately if they can capture any agricultural rent.  Colonists
are better off capturing a small rent than losing the land
entirely because they decided to delay clearing.
The effects of strengthening property for the standing forest are
similar to the impacts of a lower discount rate, illustrated in
Figure 1.  Several authors including (Ehui and Hertel, 1989,
Mahar 1989, Repetto and Gillis 1988, and Southgate "et.al."
forthcoming) describe these impacts in more detail for several
less developed countries.
Property Rights in Ethno-Biological Information
Land rights are not the only tenurial factor influencing the
development of tropical forests.  Legal interests in species
and folk knowledge and in substitutes for ethno-biological
information are also important.  Sedjo (1985) and others stress
that no one has tenure in tropical forests' plant and animal
species.  Forest dwellers' rights in their environmental folk
knowledge is also very weak.  Under these circumstances,
individuals, groups, and governments can capture only a small
portion of the marginal social value, V(t), of additions toarchived ethno-biological information.  Strengthening property
rights in information would increase that portion, which would in
turn cause deforestation to fall and information collection to
rise (see ninth row of Table 1).
Technology for Using Ethno-Biological Information and Its
Substitutes
Improved techniques for collecting ethno-biological information
enhance the marginal productivity of the standing forest,
partial G[F(t),N(t)/partial F. They also enhance marginal
productivity of effort devoted to collecting species and folk
knowledge, partial G[F(t),N(t)]/partial F.  Table 1 shows a rise
in partial G[F(t),N(t)]/partial F tends to diminish deforestation
and to stimulate  information collection.  By contrast, an
increase in partial G[(F(t),N(t)]/partial N substitutes
collection effort, N(t) for forest area, F(t), both now and in
all later periods.  This allows current deforestation to
increase.  Meanwhile, current information collection declines to
accommodate an efficient increase in future information
collection.  [A decline in the marginal cost of collection
effort, W, has the same effects as an increase in partial
G[(F(t),N(t)]/partial N.
How improved technology for the recovery of ethno-biological
information affects use and management of tropical forests is an
empirical question that depends on the nature of the
technological advance.  If the technological advance increases
the usefulness of the standing forest relative to the
effectiveness of labor devoted to collection effort, then the
impact will be to slow deforestation and increase information
collection.  If the technological advance increases the
effectiveness of labor devoted to collection effort relative to
the usefulness of the forest, then the rate of deforestation will
increase, and the rate of information collection will decrease.
The results of advances in biotechnology are similarly ambiguous.
If advances in biotechnology increase the demand for prior human
knowledge in the form of collected genotypes of existing
organisms relative to the cost of producing substitutes for
collected genotypes, then deforestation should decrease, and
information collection increase.  However if advances in
biotechnology decrease the cost of producing substitutes for
collected genotypes relative to the demand for collected
genotypes, then deforestation will increase and information
collection decrease.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Any theoretical treatment of resource development trade-offs has
limitations.  Lacking a geographic dimension, this analysis
offers no specific insights into which tropical forests deserve
special protection because they feature unusually high
concentrations of threatened and potentially valuable species.
Sedjo (1985) addresses this issue.  In addition, our analysis is
deterministic and risk neutral.  So, it is not  possible to
discuss how option values associated with tropical forests'
uncollected ethno-biological information should affect land
clearing and information collection.
Data needed for empirical application of this paper's model are
also lacking.  There is wide variation among the few available
estimates of forested area in the developing world.  No long-term
time series on agricultural land clearing exists for any country.
Rarer still are data on tropical forests' ethno-biological
information.  No country keeps comprehensive reports on effort
devoted to information collection or on newly-discovered species
or efforts to enhance the value of previously-discovered species.
Regardless of the impediments to empirical application, this
paper's analysis sheds light on factors influencing the
development of ethno-biologically diverse tropical forests.
Policies enhancing the rents associated with deforestation also
diminish the collection of species and folk knowledge.
Establishing ecosystem reserves could have a lesser impact on
total deforestation and collection of ethno-biological
information than debt relief, which reduces real interest rates.
Giving loggers and agricultural colonists the land rights they
need to capture capital gains associated with delayed
deforestation encourages conservation of tropical forests.
Finally, improved techniques for gathering species and folk
knowledge and advancements in biotechnology might or might not
strengthen incentives to conserve tropical forests.  The size of
technological innovation's impacts depends on evolving property
rights for ethno-biological information.  These findings, we
hope, will contribute to the development of effective strategies
for managing and conserving tree-covered land near the equator.REFERENCES
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